Christophe Labreuche, Thales Research & Technology, France
Accepted Papers (in order of submission):
Andreas Darmann. Hedonic Diversity Games Revisited
Haris Aziz and Aditya Ganguly. Participatory Funding Coordination: Model, Axioms and Rules
Haris Aziz and Alexander Lam. Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules
Luis Müller and Matthias Bentert. On Reachable Assignments in Cycles
Andreas Darmann, Ulrich Pferschy, Clément Dallard, Peter Muršič, Martin Milanic, Nina Chiarelli, Nevena Pivač and Stefan Lendl. Allocating Indivisible Items with Minimum Dissatisfaction on Preference Graphs
Nimrod Talmon, Eyal Leizerovich and Gil Ben Zvi. Iterative Deliberation via Metric Aggregation
Paul Alain Kaldjob Kaldjob, Brice Mayag and Denis Bouyssou. Necessary and possible interaction in a 2-maxitive Sugeno integral model
Hugo Martin and Patrice Perny. Incremental Preference Elicitation with Bipolar Choquet Integrals
Xudong Liu and Mirek Truszczynski. Probabilistic Lexicographic Preference Trees
Beatrice Napolitano, Olivier Cailloux and Paolo Viappiani. Simultaneous Elicitation of Scoring Rule and Agent Preferences for Robust Winner Determination
Leora Schmerler and Noam Hazon. Strategic Voting in Negotiating Teams
Loïc Adam and Sébastien Destercke. Incremental elicitation of preferences: optimist or pessimist?
Abu Mohammad Hammad Ali, Elizabeth Rayner, Howard J. Hamilton, Boting Yang and Sandra Zilles. Aggregating Preferences Represented by Conditional Preference Networks
Thekla Hamm, Martin Lackner and Anna Rapberger. Computing Kemeny Rankings From d-Euclidean Preferences
Ruben Becker, Gianlorenzo D’Angelo, Esmaeil Delfaraz and Hugo Gilbert. Unveiling the Truth in Liquid Democracy with Misinformed Voters
Yongjie Yang. The Nonmanipulative Vote-Deficits of Defending YourWinners
Laurent Gourves, Julien Lesca and Anaëlle Wilczynski. On Fairness via Picking Sequences in Allocation of Indivisible Goods
Linus Boes, Dorothea Baumeister and Johanna Hillebrand. Complexity of Manipulative Interference in Participatory Budgeting
Joanna Kaczmarek and Jörg Rothe. Manipulation in Communication Structures of Graph-Restricted Weighted Voting Games
Nawal Benabbou, Cassandre Leroy, Thibaut Lust and Patrice Perny. Interactive Optimization of Submodular Functions under Matroid Constraints
Parham Shams, Aurélie Beynier, Sylvain Bouveret and Nicolas Maudet. Minimizing and balancing envy among agents using Ordered Weighted Average
Arnaud Grivet Sébert, Nicolas Maudet, Patrice Perny and Paolo Viappiani. Preference Aggregation in the Generalised Unavailable Candidate Model
Bruno Escoffier, Olivier Spanjaard and Magdaléna Tydrichova. Measuring Nearly Single-peakedness of an Electorate: Some New Insights
Ryoji Wada, Taiki Todo and Makoto Yokoo. Lazy Gale-Shapley for Many-to-One Matching with Partial Information
Ben Abramowitz, Ehud Shapiro and Nimrod Talmon. In the Beginning There Were n Agents: Founding and Amending a Constitution
Ben Abramowitz, Edith Elkind, Davide Grossi, Ehud Shapiro and Nimrod Talmon. Democratic Forking: Choosing Sides with Social Choice
Kshitija Taywade, Judy Goldsmith and Brent Harrison. Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning for Decentralized Stable Matching
