- paper abstract
How to do social simulation in logic: modelling the segregation game in a dynamic logic of assignments
Benoit Gaudou, Andreas Herzig, Emiliano Lorini, Christophe Sibertin-Blanc
The aim of this paper is to show how to do social simulation in logic.
In order to meet this objective we present a dynamic logic with assignments, tests,
sequential and nondeterministic composition, and bounded and non-bounded iteration.
We show that our logic allows to represent and reason about a paradigmatic
example of social simulation: Schelling’s segregation game. We also build
a bridge between social simulation and planning. In particular, we show that
the problem of checking whether a given property P (such as segregation) will
emerge after n simulation moves is nothing but the planning problem with horizon
n, which is widely studied in AI: the problem of verifying whether there
exists a plan of length at most n ensuring that a given goal will be achieved.
A preliminary version was presented at the MABS workshop in 2011.
Andreas Herzig, Emiliano Lorini, Frédéric Moisan, Nicolas Troquard.
``A dynamic logic of normative systems''.
Proc. IJCAI 2011