

Definitions and Detection Procedures of Timing Anomalies for the Formal Verification of Predictability in Real-Time Systems

CAPITAL Workshop

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June 13, 2023

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Outline

1 Introduction

- Context
- Timing Anomalies
- Related Work & Positioning

2 Assessment of the Existing Formal Definitions of TAs

3 Novel Definition of Counter-Intuitive TAs with a Detection Procedure

4 Conclusion

Real-Time (RT) Systems

Timing behavior


Strong timing requirements
→ *temporal correctness*

Formal modeling and verification


Real-Time (RT) Systems



Strong timing requirements
→ *temporal correctness*
Formal modeling and verification




Real-Time (RT) Systems




↙	LD	r1, 0(r2)	; A
↘	ADD	r3, r1, r4	; B
↙	ADD	r5, r6, r7	; C
↘	LD	r8, (0)r5	; D

Program (Instruction sequence)

Strong timing requirements
 → *temporal correctness*
 Formal modeling and verification



Real-Time (RT) Systems




LD	r1, 0(r2)	; A
ADD	r3, r1, r4	; B
ADD	r5, r6, r7	; C
LD	r8, (0)r5	; D

Program (Instruction sequence)

No real-time notion

Strong timing requirements
 → *temporal correctness*
 Formal modeling and verification


Unknown input data
 and HW state



Performance enhancers

Predictability

Timing behavior



WCET Analysis

Worst-Case-Execution-Time Analysis:

- Test measurements & Probabilistic analysis
- Static analysis
 - Microarchitecture (instructions → clock cycles)
- Compositional analysis (e.g., pipeline+cache)

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
No exhaustive exploration, but *estimates*.

⚠ **Timing Anomalies (TAs)** jeopardize all methods.

Timing Anomalies (TAs)

(At least) 2 *execution traces* of the same program trace:

- Same input program and data
- Distinct initial hardware states
- Variation in *latencies*



- **Counter-intuitive** TAs → jeopardize all WCET analyses
- **Amplification** TAs → jeopardize *compositional* timing analyses

Motivation

- COTS (Commercial off-the-shelf) processors are subject to TAs and are more and more used in RT systems.
- Understanding TAs is crucial for the analysis of the timing behavior of RT systems.
- The execution of specific binaries may hide some TAs.
→ **Need for a reliable code-specific detection of TAs**

Our Approach towards the Detection of TAs

- ① How to set up a modeling and verification strategy for a *detection procedure*?
 - Formal tools for modeling systems and verifying timing properties
 - Case study: amplification TAs on an industrial in-order processor
- ② How to *interpret* TAs wrt. WCET?
 - Nature of TAs
- ③ Which criteria for a reliable formal definition of TAs?
 - Case study: counter-intuitive TAs on an Out-of-Order (OoO) processor

State of the Art

- Formalization of timing anomalies in microarchitectures
- Hardware timing modeling
- Formal methods for hardware verification
- Modeling and verification tools

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Overview of the Existing Definitions & Procedures of TAs

	Time in FUs	Step heights	Intersections	Occupation	Locality	Analysis	Hardware	Amplifications	Procedure	
Definitions	Variations					Interp.				
Lundqvist and Stenström		Unspec.						✓	✓	
Wenzel et al.	✓					✓		✓		
Gebhard		✓					✓			
Reineke and Sen		✓				✓				
Kirner et al.			✓				✓	✓		
Cassez et al.			✓				✓			
Eisinger et al.			✓			✓	✓		✓	
Kirner et al.				✓			✓	✓		
Reineke et al.					✓	✓				

Various criteria are used for *latencies* and thus *variations*.

	Time in FUs	Step heights	Intersections	Occupation	Locality	Analysis	Hardware	Amplifications	Procedure	
Definitions	Variations					Interp.				
Lundqvist and Stenström		Unspec.						✓	✓	
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Reineke and Sen		✓				✓				
Kirner et al.			✓				✓	✓		
Cassez et al.			✓				✓			
Eisinger et al.			✓			✓	✓		✓	
Kirner et al.				✓			✓	✓		
Reineke et al.					✓	✓				

The phenomenon is subjected to *interpretations*.

	Time in FUs	Step heights	Intersections	Occupation	Locality	Analysis	Hardware	Amplifications	Procedure
Definitions	Variations					Interp.			
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Reineke and Sen		✓				✓			
Kirner et al.			✓				✓	✓	
Cassez et al.			✓				✓		
Eisinger et al.			✓			✓	✓		✓
Kirner et al.				✓			✓	✓	
Reineke et al.					✓	✓			

Amplification TAs usually defined as a complement.

	Time in FUs	Step heights	Intersections	Occupation	Locality	Analysis	Hardware	Amplifications	Procedure
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Kirner et al.				✓			✓	✓	
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Work around TAs widely theoretical and not *executable*

	Time in FUs	Step heights	Intersections	Occupation	Locality	Analysis	Hardware	Amplifications	Procedure
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Kirner et al.				✓			✓	✓	
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Contributions

① Heuristics for the detection of amplification-TA patterns

- Binder et al., “Scalable Detection of Amplification Timing Anomalies for the Superscalar TriCore Architecture” (FMICS20)
- Binder et al., “Formal Modeling and Verification for Amplification Timing Anomalies in the Superscalar TriCore Architecture” (STTT21)

② Unified formal framework for assessing the various definitions

- Binder et al., “Formal Processor Modeling for Analyzing Safety and Security Properties” (ERTS22)
- Binder et al., “Is This Still Normal? Putting Definitions of Timing Anomalies to the Test” (RTCSA21)

③ Novel formal definition of counter-intuitive TAs with a detection procedure

- Binder et al., “The Role of Causality in a Formal Definition of Timing Anomalies” (RTCSA22)

Outline

1 Introduction

2 Assessment of the Existing Formal Definitions of TAs

- Motivation
- Formal Hardware Model
- Different Notions for Latencies
- Model Checking

3 Novel Definition of Counter-Intuitive TAs with a Detection Procedure

4 Conclusion

How to Concretely Apply the Definitions?

- HW models restricted to theoretical concepts
→ Definitions usually not implemented as procedures
- Incomplete definitions per se and illustrated only through partial examples
- Different levels of *granularity* to define **latencies/**variations

Contributions

- 1 *Systematic* approach, precise assumptions
- 2 *Formal hardware model* (TLA⁺)
 - Parameterizable formal model of a representative OoO pipeline template
 - An *executable procedure* in the form of a predicate for each definition
- 3 *Assessment* of the definitions by model checking
(finding contradictions)

Benjamin Binder et al. “Is This Still Normal? Putting Definitions of Timing Anomalies to the Test”. In: *IEEE 27th International Conference on Embedded and Real-Time Computing Systems and Applications (RTCSA)*. 2021, pp. 139–148. doi: 10.1109/RTCSA52859.2021.00024


Modeling Requirements

- No functional aspects beyond the pipeline level
→ *cycle-accurate* timing (\mathbb{N})
- Abstract data path: only pipeline stages (\mathcal{I})
- Abstract control path: signals impacting the stalling logic
- Focus on instruction (\mathcal{I}) progress (SW) through the pipeline stages (HW)
Execution: $\mathcal{I} \times \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathcal{I}$

Benjamin Binder et al. “Formal Processor Modeling for Analyzing Safety and Security Properties”. In: *11th European Congress Embedded Real Time Systems (ERTS)*. 2022

Out-of-Order (OoO) Pipeline Template

A concrete HW model as a simple *unified* framework.




Representative **OoO pipeline template** based on Tomasulo's algorithm with N_{FU} functional units, fetching and committing *superscal* instructions per cycle.

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A concrete HW model as a simple *unified* framework.

↙ LD r1, 0(r2) ; A
↙ ADD r3, r1, r4 ; B
↙ ADD r5, r6, r7 ; C
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


Out-of-Order (OoO) Pipeline Template

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↘ LD   r1, 0(r2) ; A
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↘ ADD  r5, r6, r7 ; C
↘ LD   r8, (0)r5 ; D
  
```



A TA on the OoO Pipeline Template

A concrete example of a TA:

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
α A	IF	ID	FU ₁	COM									
B	IF	ID	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM						
C		IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM			
D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM•

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A concrete example of a TA:

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
α	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	COM									
	B	IF	ID	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM						
	C		IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM			
	D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM•
β	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM							
	B	IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM			
	C		IF	ID	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	ROB	ROB	ROB	COM			
	D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	ROB	COM•		

What Could be a *Latency*?

- Focus on specific events only:
 - Instruction *commit*
Kirner, Kadlec, and Puschner, *Worst-Case Execution Time Analysis for Processors showing Timing Anomalies*
Eisinger et al., "Automatic Identification of Timing Anomalies for Cycle-Accurate Worst-Case Execution Time Analysis"
Gebhard, "Timing Anomalies Reloaded"
Cassez, Hansen, and Olesen, "What is a Timing Anomaly?"
 - Instruction *fetch*
Reineke and Sen, "Sound and Efficient WCET Analysis in the Presence of Timing Anomalies"
- Finer-grained comparison of the utilization of *local* resources
Reineke et al., "A Definition and Classification of Timing Anomalies"
- Other viewpoint: not instruction latencies but a *total* resource use
Kirner, Kadlec, and Puschner, "Precise Worst-Case Execution Time Analysis for Processors with Timing Anomalies"

Application of Various Formal Definitions (on the 2 traces)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
α	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	COM								
	B	IF	ID	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM					
	C		IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM		
	D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁
β	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM						
	B	IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM		
	C		IF	ID	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	ROB	ROB	ROB	COM		
	D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	ROB	COM•	

Figure: Execution traces

¹Reineke et al., "A Definition and Classification of Timing Anomalies"

Application of Various Formal Definitions (on the 2 traces)

Commit events only¹

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
α	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	COM									
	B	IF	ID	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM						
	C		IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM			
	D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM•
β	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM							
	B	IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM			
	C		IF	ID	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	ROB	ROB	ROB	COM			
	D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	ROB	COM•		

Figure: Execution traces showing the order of commits (→)

¹Kirner, Kadlec, and Puschner, *Worst-Case Execution Time Analysis for Processors showing Timing Anomalies*; Cassez, Hansen, and Olesen, "What is a Timing Anomaly?"

Application of Various Formal Definitions (on the 2 traces)

Locality + Commit events ¹

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
α	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	COM									
	B	IF	ID	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM						
	C		IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM			
	D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM•
β	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM							
	B	IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM			
	C		IF	ID	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	ROB	ROB	ROB	COM			
	D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	ROB	COM•		

Figure: Execution traces showing the order of commits (→) and the common prefix (□).

¹Reineke et al., "A Definition and Classification of Timing Anomalies"

Properties for the Absence of TAs

- 2 instances of the pipeline specification (hyperproperty \rightarrow self-composition)
 \rightarrow 2 traces (same program but different *actual choices*)
- Additional operators and state variables
- Example: definition based on commit events
 \rightarrow Keep track of the instant of each commit event (*comTime*)

Commit Events: Invariant for the absence of TAs

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{NoTA} &\triangleq \forall k \in 1.. \text{Len}(\text{Program}) - 1 : \forall n \in k+1.. \text{Len}(\text{Program}) : \\
 &\quad \wedge \text{ProgDone}(n) \\
 &\quad \wedge \text{ComTime}(1, k) < \text{ComTime}(2, k) \\
 &\quad \implies \text{ComTime}(1, n) \leq \text{ComTime}(2, n)
 \end{aligned}$$

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
α	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	COM									
	A	IF	ID	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM						
	C		IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM			
	D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM•
β	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM							
	B	IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM			
	C		IF	ID	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	ROB	ROB	ROB	COM			
	D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	ROB	COM•		

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 \end{aligned}$$

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
α	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	COM	k								
	k	IF	ID	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM	n					
	C		IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM			
	D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM•
β	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM							
	B	IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM			
	C		IF	ID	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	ROB	ROB	ROB	COM			
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 \end{aligned}$$

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
α	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	COM	k								
	A	IF	ID	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM						
	C		IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM	n		
	D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM•
β	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM							
	B	IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM			
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α	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	COM	k								
	A	IF	ID	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM						
	C		IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM			
	D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM • n
β	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM							
	B	IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM			
	C		IF	ID	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	ROB	ROB	ROB	COM			
	D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	ROB	COM •		

Assessment Methodology

- Model checking: looking for *inconsistent scenarios*
- Based on variations of an input program found in the literature


Counterexamples (CEX) derived from different invariants



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- Model checking: looking for *inconsistent scenarios*
- Based on variations of an input program found in the literature


Counterexamples (CEX) derived from different **invariants**



Assessment Methodology

- Model checking: looking for *inconsistent scenarios*
- Based on variations of an input program found in the literature

Counterexamples (CEX) derived from different invariants



Contradictory Statements about TAs due to Different Granularities

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
α	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM				
	B	IF	ID	FU ₂	FU ₂	ROB	COM				
	C		IF	ID	RS ₃	RS ₃	FU ₃	FU ₃	FU ₃	COM	
	D		IF	ID	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	ROB	COM	
	E			IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂
β	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM				
	B	IF	ID	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM				
	C		IF	ID	RS ₃	RS ₃	FU ₃	FU ₃	FU ₃	COM	
	D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM	
	E			IF	ID	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	ROB	COM

Contradictory Statements about TAs due to Different Granularities

In particular the definitions based on instruction latencies vs. locality:

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
α	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM					
	B	IF	ID	FU ₂	FU ₂	ROB	COM					
	C		IF	ID	RS ₃	RS ₃	FU ₃	FU ₃	FU ₃	COM		
	D		IF	ID	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	ROB	COM		
	E			IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM
β	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM					
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	C		IF	ID	RS ₃	RS ₃	FU ₃	FU ₃	FU ₃	COM		
	D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM		
	E			IF	ID	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	ROB	COM	

The formal definition based on commit events only (→) **does not** signal a TA

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	C		IF	ID	RS ₃	RS ₃	FU ₃	FU ₃	FU ₃	COM		
	D		IF	ID	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	ROB	COM		
	E			IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM
β	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM					
	B	IF	ID	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM					
	C		IF	ID	RS ₃	RS ₃	FU ₃	FU ₃	FU ₃	COM		
	D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM		
	E			IF	ID	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	ROB	COM	

The formal definition based on commit events only (→) **does not** signal a TA, whereas the definition based on locality (□) **does**.

Commit Events Show a Particular Effect

Same TA pattern:

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
α	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM								
	B	IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM					
	C		IF	IF	IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM		
	D		IF	IF	IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁
β	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM								
	B	IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM				
	C		IF	ID	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	ROB	ROB	ROB	COM				
	D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	ROB	COM●			

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	C		IF	IF	IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM		
	D		IF	IF	IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁ COM•
β	A	F	ID	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM								
	B	F	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM				
	C		IF	ID	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	ROB	ROB	ROB	COM				
	D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	ROB	COM•			

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	D		IF	IF	IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁
β	A	FI	ID	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM								
	B	FI	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM				
	C		IF	ID	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	ROB	ROB	ROB	COM				
	D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	ROB	COM●			

The TA is due to an effect on previous instructions.

The definitions that signal a TA **do not correctly capture it.**

No Definition is Reliable on an OoO Pipeline

- Contradictory statements about TAs
- **No definition dominates others**
- It is clear what a TA is *not* (intuitive understanding)
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- **No definition accurately characterizes TAs.**
- No restrictions on the applicability conditions
 - Standard microarchitecture & simple examples
 - Main deficiency: the notion of **causality**
- ⇒ A precise formal definition was still needed.

Outline

1 Introduction

2 Assessment of the Existing Formal Definitions of TAs

3 Novel Definition of Counter-Intuitive TAs with a Detection Procedure

- Working Principle
- Interpretation on Simple Examples
- Evaluation on Benchmarks

4 Conclusion

Requirements of Our Definition

- Independent of any WCET-analysis technique
- Integration of **causality**
- Generic notions
- Instantiation for a *well-specified* HW model
 - Clear assumptions for a **detection procedure** (OoO pipeline)


Benjamin Binder et al. “The Role of Causality in a Formal Definition of Timing Anomalies”. In: *IEEE 28th International Conference on Embedded and Real-Time Computing Systems and Applications (RTCSA)*. 2022, pp. 91–102. doi: 10.1109/RTCSA55878.2022.00016

Basic Established TA Pattern

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	
α	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	COM									
	B	IF	ID	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM						
	C		IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM			
	D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM
	E			IF	ID	FU ₃	FU ₃	FU ₃	ROB	ROB	ROB	ROB	ROB	COM
β	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM							
	B	IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM			
	C		IF	ID	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	ROB	ROB	ROB	COM			
	D		IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	ROB	COM		
	E			IF	ID	FU ₃	FU ₃	FU ₃	ROB	ROB	ROB	COM		


Nodes

1 – Events emerging from trace α




Arcs of the Event Time-Dependence Graph

2 – Minimal durations (imposed by the hardware)




Identification of Latencies

3 – 1 favorable variation (■)




Causality Graph

4 – Only the arcs that *determine* the instants of the destination events




Causality Graph

4 – Only the arcs that *determine* the instants of the destination events



Causality Graph

5 – Causal region (■) of the favorable variation




Final Verdict

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
α A	IF	ID	FU ₁	COM	. $\delta_\alpha = 1$								
B	IF	ID	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM						
C	IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM				
D	IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM	
E		IF	ID	FU ₃	FU ₃	FU ₃	ROB	ROB	ROB	ROB	ROB	ROB	COM

Final Verdict

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
α	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	COM	. $\delta_\alpha = 1$							
	B	IF	ID	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM					
	C	IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM			
	D	IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM
	E		IF	ID	FU ₃	FU ₃	FU ₃	ROB	ROB	ROB	ROB	ROB	ROB
β	A	IF	ID	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM	. $\delta_\beta = 3$					
	B	IF	ID	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	RS ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	COM		
	C	IF	ID	FU ₂	FU ₂	FU ₂	ROB	ROB	ROB	COM			
	D	IF	ID	RS ₁	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	ROB	COM		
	E		IF	ID	FU ₃	FU ₃	FU ₃	ROB	ROB	ROB	COM		


Final Verdict



6 – Identification of TAs (■)

- comparison of the *relative* time distances (Δ)

Final Verdict



Conforming with the intuitive definition, with:

- precisely defined *variations*;
- causal region limiting the *scope* of the verdict;
- comparison of the *relative* time distances (Δ)

Formalization of the Definition

For $\tau = \alpha$ or $\tau = \beta$, let $e_{\tau\uparrow} = (i, \uparrow r_{\tau}, t_{\tau\uparrow})$ be an acquisition event and $e_{\tau\downarrow} = (i, \downarrow r_{\tau}, t_{\tau\downarrow})$ be the matching release event, s.t. $e_{\beta\uparrow} = \text{CospEvent}(e_{\alpha\uparrow})$ and $e_{\beta\downarrow} = \text{CospEvent}(e_{\alpha\downarrow})$.

Definition (Counter-Intuitive Timing Anomaly)

Event $e_{\alpha\downarrow}$ triggers a *counter-intuitive* TA at event e wrt. β , iff:

- 1 **Variation:** α exhibits a *favorable variation* at $e_{\alpha\downarrow}$, i.e.:

$$(\delta_{\alpha} = t_{\alpha\downarrow} - t_{\alpha\uparrow}) < (t_{\beta\downarrow} - t_{\beta\uparrow} = \delta_{\beta})$$

- 2 **Causality:** e is a node of the *causal region* $\mathcal{C}(e_{\alpha\downarrow})$ of the variation:

$$e \in \mathcal{N}_{\mathcal{C}(e_{\alpha\downarrow})}$$

- 3 **Slowdown:** α exhibits a *relative slowdown*, expressed as:

$$\Delta(e_{\alpha\downarrow}, e) > \Delta(e_{\beta\downarrow}, \text{CospEvent}(e))$$

→ All definitions are introduced formally.

Features of the Procedure


- Procedure integrated into TLA⁺'s model checker
- Faithfully represents the established TA *patterns*, excluding false positives.
- Open problem: *composition* of variations and timing effects.

Illustration of the Separation of Unrelated Variations

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
α A	I	F	I	FU ₁	COM						
B		I	F	I	FU ₁	COM					
C			I	F	I	FU ₁	COM				
D				I	F	I	FU ₁	COM			
E					I	F	I	F	I	I	FU ₁ COM•
β A	I	F	I	FU ₁	FU ₁	FU ₁	COM				
B		I	F	I	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	COM			
C			I	F	I	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	COM		
D				I	F	I	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	COM	
E					I	F	I	RS ₁	RS ₁	FU ₁	COM•


- Totally independent variations, same scheduling on FU₁
- All existing definitions surprisingly state a TA

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
- Totally independent variations, same scheduling on FU₁
- All existing definitions surprisingly state a TA
- Our definition splits the traces into independent parts, hence no TA.

TAs May Be Limited in Scope




- Existing definitions: no TA or instruction *B* incriminated

TAs May Be Limited in Scope



- Existing definitions: no TA or instruction B incriminated
- We capture the resource contention in FU_2 in β that blocks B due to the variation in C .
- We also capture that the TA propagates in a *limited scope*.

Application on TACLe Benchmarks: Workflow



Synthesis of Some Results

#	benchmark	N_{instr}	$ mayDMiss $	$superscal$	asym	result	time	diam.	states
5	countneg	50	4	4	✓	true	00:01:24	59	2105
6				2		simple cex	00:00:12	43	728
9	iir	100	4	4	✓	simple cex	00:03:10	100	4749
10	cosf	30	7	4	✓	true	00:23:24	86	118880
11				2		true	00:22:50	86	118991
12	fft	100	3	4	✓	true	00:00:26	98	834
13	fir2dim	100	4	4	✓	simple cex	00:05:42	81	1800
14	insertsort	30	6	4	✓	cex [◦]	00:00:31	29	3333
15					*	true	00:00:15	71	1159
16				✓	cex ^{◦◦}	00:00:26	30	3632	
17				2	*	simple cex	00:00:17	37	456
18	complexup	100	4	4	✓	simple cex	00:02:17	79	2563
19	bitonic	100	30	4	✓	simple cex	00:05:21	35	18008

◦: composition of variations

◦◦: + no COM event for TAs

asym: $IF \wedge NxtFU(i).ind \in mayDMiss$ (✓) $\wedge exec_inst = 2 \implies NxtFU(i).ind \neq Min(mayDMiss)$ (*) $\wedge exec_inst = 2$

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(*) $\wedge exec_inst = 2$

Synthesis of Some Results

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5	countneg	50	4	4	✓	true	00:01:24	59	2105
6				2		simple cex	00:00:12	43	728
9	iir	100	4	4	✓	simple cex	00:03:10	100	4749
10	cosf	30	7	4	✓	true	00:23:24	86	118880
11				2		true	00:22:50	86	118991
12	fft	100	3	4	✓	true	00:00:26	98	834
13	fir2dim	100	4	4	✓	simple cex	00:05:42	81	1800
14	insertsort	30	6	4	✓	cex [◦]	00:00:31	29	3333
15				*	true	00:00:15	71	1159	
16				✓	cex ^{◦◦}	00:00:26	30	3632	
17				2	*	simple cex	00:00:17	37	456
18	complexup	100	4	4	✓	simple cex	00:02:17	79	2563
19	bitonic	100	30	4	✓	simple cex	00:05:21	35	18008

◦: composition of variations

◦◦: + no COM event for TAs

asym: $IF \wedge NxtFU(i).ind \in mayDMiss$

(✓) $\wedge exec_inst = 2 \implies NxtFU(i).ind \neq Min(mayDMiss)$

(*) $\wedge exec_inst = 2$

Outline

1 Introduction

2 Assessment of the Existing Formal Definitions of TAs

3 Novel Definition of Counter-Intuitive TAs with a Detection Procedure

4 Conclusion

- Recap
- Future Work

Recap

- TAs = execution phenomena that jeopardize predictability
 - Counter-intuitive TAs
 - Amplification TAs
- Lack of *tool support* for their detection and their understanding

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→ Notion of *causality*
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Recap

- TAs = execution phenomena that jeopardize predictability
 - Counter-intuitive TAs
 - Amplification TAs
- Lack of *tool support* for their detection and their understanding
- Limitations of the existing formal definitions of counter-intuitive TAs
→ Notion of *causality*
- Novel definition & detection procedure
- Extension of the procedure based on a precondition for amplification TAs
→ Appropriate state-space *reductions*
- Strategies for multiple execution scenarios that help building culprit SW patterns

Future Work

- Improvement of the detection procedure (counter-intuitive TAs)
 - Speedup based on causality (on the fly)
 - Further benchmarking
 - Refinement of the model (composition) and the procedure:
more concrete scheduler, side effects on the HW states, other HW resources (e.g., speculation)

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- Utilization of the heuristics for SW patterns
 - Efficient counter-measures preserving convenient static analyses
 - Integration into a WCET analyzer

Thank you!

Definitions and Detection Procedures of Timing Anomalies for the Formal Verification of Predictability in Real-Time Systems

CAPITAL Workshop

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June 13, 2023

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