Sixth International Workshop on Computational Social Choice
Toulouse, France, 22–24 June 2016

Accepted Papers

The accepted papers are:

  • Cycles and Intractability in Social Choice Theory
    William Zwicker
  • Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites
    Katarina Cechlarova, Bettina Klaus and David Manlove
  • Who Can Win a Single-Elimination Tournament?
    Michael P. Kim, Warut Suksompong and Virginia Vassilevska Williams
  • Fairness in voting: the tale of Blotto's lieutenants
    Alessandra Casella, Jean-Francois Laslier and Antonin Macé
  • Proving the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness via SMT Solving
    Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt and Christian Geist
  • Agenda Separability in Judgment Aggregation
    Jerome Lang, Marija Slavkovik and Srdjan Vesic
  • Arguing about Voting Rules
    Olivier Cailloux and Ulle Endriss
  • Parameterized Complexity Results for the Kemeny Rule in Judgment Aggregation
    Ronald de Haan
  • On Voting and Facility Location
    Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Iddan Golomb
  • Bounds on Manipulation by Merging in Weighted Voting Games
    Ramoni Lasisi and Abibat Lasisi
  • Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting
    Reshef Meir
  • Ordinal power relations and social rankings
    Stefano Moretti and Meltem Ozturk
  • Analyzing games with ambiguous types using the MINthenMAX decision model
    Ilan Nehama
  • Rules for Choosing Societal Tradeoffs
    Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Markus Brill and Yuqian Li
  • Condorcet Domains and Median Graphs
    Clemens Puppe and Arkadii Slinko
  • Fair Social Choice in Dynamic Settings
    Rupert Freeman, Seyed Majid Zahedi and Vincent Conitzer
  • Computing Pareto Optimal Committees
    Haris Aziz, Jerome Lang and Jerome Monnot
  • Altruistic Hedonic Games
    Nhan-Tam Nguyen, Anja Rey, Lisa Rey, Jorg Rothe and Lena Schend
  • Verification in Incomplete Argumentation Frameworks
    Dorothea Baumeister, Daniel Neugebauer, Jorg Rothe and Hilmar Schadrack
  • Natural Interviewing Equilibria for Stable Matching
    Joanna Drummond, Allan Borodin and Kate Larson
  • Strategy-Proofness of Scoring Allocation Correspondences
    Nhan-Tam Nguyen, Dorothea Baumeister and Jorg Rothe
  • Single-peakedness Based on the Net Preference Matrix: Characterization and Algorithms
    Olivier Spanjaard and Paul Weng
  • Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas
    Katarina Cechlarova and Tamás Fleiner
  • Bayesian Estimators As Voting Rules
    Lirong Xia
  • The Single-Peaked Domain Revisited: A Simple Global Characterization
    Clemens Puppe
  • Learning Mixtures of Plackett-Luce models
    Zhibing Zhao, Peter Piech and Lirong Xia
  • Misrepresentation in District Voting
    Yoram Bachrach, Omer Lev, Yoad Lewenberg and Yair Zick
  • Divide and Conquer: Using Geographic Manipulation to Win District-Based Elections
    Yoad Lewenberg and Omer Lev
  • How effective can simple ordinal peer grading be?
    Ioannis Caragiannis, George Krimpas and Alexandros Voudouris
  • Recognising Multidimensional Euclidean Preferences
    Dominik Peters
  • How Hard Is It to Control a Group?
    Yongjie Yang and Dinko Dimitrov
  • Efficiency and Sequenceability in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods with Additive Preferences
    Sylvain Bouveret and Michel Lemaître
  • Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
    Matias Nunez and Marcus Pivato
  • On Truthful Mechanisms for Maximin Share Allocations
    Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas and Evangelos Markakis
  • Object allocation problems under constraints
    Laurent Gourves, Carlos Martinhon and Jerome Monnot
  • Conditional and Sequential Approval Voting on Combinatorial Domains
    Nathanaël Barrot and Jerome Lang
  • A Majoritarian Representative Voting System
    Pietro Speroni di Fenizio and Daniele A. Gewurz
  • Structure in Dichotomous Preferences
    Edith Elkind and Martin Lackner
  • Borda, Condorcet, and Pareto optimality in ordinal group activity selection
    Andreas Darmann
  • Proportional Borda Allocations
    Andreas Darmann and Christian Klamler
  • Majority Graphs of Assignment Problems and Properties of Popular Random Assignments
    Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer and Martin Suderland
  • Optimal Reallocation under Additive and Ordinal Preferences
    Haris Aziz, Peter Biro, Jerome Lang, Julien Lesca and Jerome Monnot
  • Committee Scoring Rules
    Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko and Nimrod Talmon
  • Analyzing the Practical Relevance of Voting Paradoxes via Ehrhart Theory, Computer Simulations, and Empirical Data
    Felix Brandt, Christian Geist and Martin Strobel
  • The one-dimensional Euclidean preferences: Finitely many forbidden substructures are not enough
    Jiehua Chen, Kirk Pruhs and Gerhard J. Woeginger
  • And the winner is ... Chevalier de Borda: Neural networks vote according to Borda's Rule
    Dávid Burka, Clemens Puppe, László Szepesváry and Attila Tasnadi
  • Axiomatic Characterization of Committee Scoring Rules
    Piotr Skowron, Piotr Faliszewski and Arkadii Slinko
  • Incremental Approval Voting for Multi-agent Knapsack Problems
    Nawal Benabbou and Patrice Perny
  • Edge-Compressed Majority Graph: Where Social Choice Meets Information Visualization
    Nikos Karanikolas, Renaud Blanch and Sylvain Bouveret
  • Doodle Poll Games
    Svetlana Obraztsova, Maria Polukarov, Zinovi Rabinovich and Edith Elkind
  • Automated Verification for Functional and Relational Properties of Voting Rules
    Bernhard Beckert, Thorsten Bormer, Michael Kirsten, Till Neuber and Mattias Ulbrich
  • Complexity of Manipulative Actions When Voting with Ties
    Zack Fitzsimmons and Edith Hemaspaandra
  • The Random Pairs Voting Rule: Introduction and Evaluation With a Large Dataset
    Jeremy Hansen
  • Equilibria of Plurality Voting: Lazy and Truth-biased Voters
    Edith Elkind, Evangelos Markakis, Svetlana Obraztsova and Piotr Skowron
  • Refinement and randomised versions of some tournament solutions
    Justin Kruger, Stéphane Airiau and Jérôme Lang